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 Liberalism as a Form of Economic Nationalism 
 
Introduction 
Whereas the literature on political nationalism is vast, relatively little has been written on 
economic nationalism. Much of the literature that does exist, views economic nationalism as an 
“outdated phenomenon in this age of globalisation” (Helleiner and Pickel, 2005: p. vii). 
Economic nationalism has traditionally been associated with protectionist policies, which are 
perceived to contradict liberal policies with their emphasis on free trade and an economically 
passive, non-interventionist state (Baughn and Yaprak, 1996; Nakano, 2004). However, as Pickel 
(2003), Shulman (2000) and Nakano (2004) argue, economic nationalism is still relevant and 
does not contradict liberal policies.  
 
The purpose of this paper is firstly to demonstrate the relevance of economic nationalism. 
Secondly, by investigating the origins of neoliberal economic policies and the motives behind 
them, using policy formulation in Estonia as a case, I show how Estonian national identity 
shaped economic policy in post-socialist Estonia. I claim that economic nationalism and 
economic liberalism are not a dichotomy. I argue that Estonian policy formulators decided to 
pursue neoliberal policies because they perceived them to best serve their objectives of 
regaining and maintaining their sovereignty, breaking away from the geopolitical, economic and 
cultural influence of Russia, and reorienting their economy towards Western Europe. I draw a 
parallel between Estonian economic nationalism and neoliberal values.  
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Estonia’s post-socialist administration is among the “very few, that explicitly identify 
themselves as neoliberal” (Larner, 2000: 8). As a leading Estonian economist declared: “I am a 
supporter of neoliberal fields in economy” (interview). Estonian policy makers consider the 
neoliberal trajectory as the only viable path to closing the gap between Estonian and western 
standards of living, and maintaining the economic, political and cultural sovereignty of their 
nation. Their sense of abandonment, radical individualism and self-reliance predisposed 
Estonian policy formulators to the neoliberal utopia of ‘total freedom’. They strived to 
construct the form of economy that they perceived most compatible with their value system 
and their understanding of their environment. The neoliberal paradigm constitutes a form of 
economic nationalism in post-socialist Estonia.    
 
In this article I use the terms liberal and neoliberal synonymously following Peet (2007: 192) 
who argues that “neoliberalism is merely liberal economics exaggerated”. 
 
The structure of the article is as follows. I begin with a discussion of the concepts of economic 
nationalism and liberalism. In the following sections I analyse Estonian national identity, its 
effects on economic policy preferences and argue that the self-image of Estonians has 
predisposed them to the value system of neoliberal thinking. Estonian policy formulators see 
the welfare of their nation best served by the pursuit of neoliberal policies.  
    
 
3 
 
Protectionism = economic nationalism ≠ economic liberalism? 
On the one hand, the drivers of globalisation – the advancement and diffusion of technology, 
the internationalisation of production, consumption, input and output markets, harmonisation 
of economic policies, and standardisation of laws and regulations across borders - all have a 
significant impact on national policies and behaviours. On the other hand, it is nations through 
their representatives at various national and international institutions that shape economic 
globalisation. In our interdependent world locational qualities – tax regimes, the state of the 
infrastructure, the economic, political and legal environment, spending on health care and 
education – are all largely determined by decisions made at national governmental level. “As 
states compete for global capital, we see intense efforts to play up the distinctiveness of local 
characteristics and competitive advantages” (True, 2005: 202). 
 
The literature on economic nationalism is sparse and divided. To Baughn and Yaprak (1996), 
Capling (1997) and Berend (2000) economic nationalism is equivalent to protectionism as 
well as neomercantilism. Berend (2000: 317) defines it as “guaranteeing the command of 
native investors instead of foreign entrepreneurs, thwarting foreign competition in the 
domestic market by high protective tariffs and other isolationist measures…” In Hall’s (2005: 
124) summation, economic nationalism mostly includes policies that liberal economists 
‘disapprove’. According to this view liberal policies – the promotion of free mobility of 
inputs and outputs, and non-discriminatory access to resource and output markets, which 
involve the dismantling of all forms of trade barriers – contradict economic nationalism and 
therefore are opposed by nationalist policy makers. Neoliberal theorists do not dwell on the 
concept of nation but focus on the role of the individual and the betterment of free society 
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through proactive rational individual effort unhampered by government intervention. 
Neoliberals perceive government intervention, such as restrictions on international trade, 
price fixing, and high tax burdens, as the major inhibitor to economic growth because it 
demotivates entrepreneurship and leads to misallocation of resources. According to them, 
the role of state institutions must be limited to the protection of the freedom of individual 
action and thought, maintenance of law and order, and provision of a stable monetary 
framework (Hayek, 1960; Friedman, 1962; Peet, 2007). Liberals claim that the engine of 
economic development is the self-regulating market completely free from government 
intervention, in which people are at full liberty to pursue their own goals through their 
preferred course of action culminating in the “coincidence of private and public satisfaction” 
(O’Brien, 2003: 113). Harvey (2005: 64) summarises neoliberal theory as “strong individual 
property rights, the rule of law, and institutions of freely functioning markets and free 
trade”. Friedman (1962: 38) advocates free trade as well as floating exchange rates stating 
that “restrictions on international trade… give individuals the incentive to misuse and 
misdirect resources…” 
 
Under neoliberalism politics and economics are interwoven; democracy and unimpeded free 
markets are considered inseparable. Neoliberal ideology is presented as the champion, the 
exclusive guarantor of individual freedom, in the promotion of which the market is deemed 
instrumental (Giroux, 2004). “Neoliberalism is... an economic project but it is also a moral one – 
a project of individual ethics” (Smith and Rochovská, 2007: 1166). As such, neoliberal theory 
easily lends itself to political movements that attach high values to individual liberty.  
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However, liberalism is not the equivalent of a lack of rules. “Good markets need good 
governments” (Wolf, 2005: 73). Liberalism does not mean that “government should never 
concern itself with any economic matters” (Hayek, 1960: 220). “The consistent liberal is not 
an anarchist” (Friedman, 1962: 34) but intervention in economic affairs must be evaluated 
carefully on a case by case basis.  
 
Shulman (2000), Helleiner (2002), Pickel (2003), Nakano (2004) and Kangas (2013) argue that 
liberal policies can be not only compatible with economic nationalism but can also constitute a 
type of it. Hall (2005) examines the role of economic nationalism in the Japanese context of the 
‘developmental state’. He argues that economic nationalism needs to be defined not in terms 
of policies but in terms of its goals and motivations – “of promoting the survival, strength, and 
prestige of the state and/or nation in a competitive international system” (p. 124). Then the 
contradiction between liberalism and deregulation on the one hand and economic nationalism 
on the other disappears.  
 
True (2005) examines the interdependence between economic nationalism and globalisation in 
the case of the radical economic reforms that took place in New Zealand. She brings up the 
creation of Brand New Zealand, the successful marketing of the Chinese gooseberry as the 
kiwifruit of New Zealand around the world, and New Zealand’s defence of the America’s Cup 
yachting race as examples of proactive nationalist policies promoting openness and liberalism.       
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Kangas (2013) also challenges the argument that economic nationalism is dated and is 
incompatible with neoliberalism. She uses the modernisation project of the Skolkovo 
innovation city near Moscow to underline the role of nationalism as an ‘agent’ in the 
‘domestication’ of neoliberalism in Russia.  
 
As demonstrated in the following sections, Estonian policy makers have chosen neoliberal 
policies in order to accomplish national goals: strengthening national sovereignty and 
advancing economic development. The ideal of individual freedom and hands-off economic 
policies hold immense appeal to populations, including Estonians, with experience of 
totalitarian regimes. 
  
Researching policy formulation in Estonia 
This article is an outcome of a research project aimed at uncovering the motives behind policy 
formulation in Estonia’s post-socialist economic transformation. The research objective was to 
investigate why Estonian policy makers decided to embark upon the neoliberal trajectory and 
how they arrived at those decisions. Although there is ample literature (Terk, 2000; Smith, 
2001; Feldmann and Sally, 2002 ; Feldmann, 2013; inter alia) discussing Estonia’s economic 
transformation, a critical qualitative evaluation of the motives behind the country’s neoliberal 
transformation has not taken place.  
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This paper is based on a qualitative, inductive and interpretive study, which investigates the 
motives behind the policy choices of Estonian policy formulators in the country’s post-socialist 
transformation. The respondents have been individuals who were either key decision makers, 
and/or had a major influence on policy choices of Estonia’s economic transition in the late 
1980s and 1990s. The findings are based on twenty-three face-to-face, semi-structured 
interviews that took place in Tallinn, Tartu, London, Brussels and Riga. The interviewees 
included every prime minister between 1991 and 1997, the President of the Estonian Central 
Bank who led the country’s monetary reform, members of the Central Bank’s Supervisory 
Board, economic and finance ministers, former dissidents and government advisors. Over thirty 
hours of recording has been transcribed and subsequently analysed with the aid of NVivo 
software. In order to ensure trustworthiness of the findings, member checking, self-critical 
reflection and triangulation was used. The information gained from the interviews was 
compared with documentary evidence, including the official databases and documents of 
national and international organisations. In addition, I lived in Estonia for seven years, which 
allowed me to gain an insight into Estonian culture and enabled me to become knowledgeable 
of the self-image of the Estonian people. 
 
I use a large number of quotes in my analysis in order to underline the key arguments. I 
reveal the name of the source (given the consent of the interviewees) where I think it 
enhances my point. 
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The Estonian economy: ultraliberal economic policies 
In the words of Timothy Frye (2010: 1), “(i)f the watchword of the communist era was 
conformity, the watchword of the post-communist world is diversity”. Post-communist 
transition has not followed the neoliberal model of linear transformation from centrally 
planned economy to free market economy but has gone ‘wild’ (Smith and Stenning, 2006: 
205) resulting in diverse transformations with uncertain destinations (Orenstein, 2001). The 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have witnessed the emergence of a variety of 
capitalisms. 
  
Estonia’s policies are markedly more liberal than of other transition economies. By 
consistently pursuing neoliberal policies since the country’s regaining of independence in 
1991, the successive post-socialist governments have succeeded in creating an ultra-liberal 
economic environment. Firm belief in the virtues of the market, the supply-side orientation 
of economic policies, the minimalist and non-interventionist state are all a testament to the 
neoliberal nature of the Estonian economy. The current tax legislation, which is one of the 
most liberal tax systems in the world, places more emphasis on indirect, rather than direct 
taxation. All corporate reinvested profits are tax exempt (Estonian Investment Agency). The 
various international agencies have praised Estonia’s post-socialist economic transition 
applauding its fast-growing economy based on flat taxes, free trade, hands-off industrial 
policy, business-friendly environment, low inflation rate, balanced budget and low level of 
government debt (European Central Bank). It has the most competitive economy in CEE 
(World Economic Forum, 2015). For credit rating analysts Moody’s (2007) “the country's 
success in economic stabilisation and structural transformation is unparalleled among 
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transition nations”. As recently as 2014, the country’s economy had the highest ranking (11) 
in the CEE on the Index of Economic Freedom (The Heritage Foundation). 
 
Estonian policy makers’ choice of shock therapy was “mainly ideologically motivated” 
(interview). Estonian elites proactively discarded the legacy of central planning in favour of a 
free market economy by emphasising values compatible with neoliberal theory, such as 
individual initiative, self-reliance, accountability, and a minimalistic state, that they claimed 
were the view of the good life that Estonians widely shared. The “all too visible hands of the 
party” were replaced by the invisible hand of the market (Orenstein, 1996: 181) overnight. The 
country’s first freely elected government in 1992 spearheaded a quick break with the Soviet 
past, as they claimed that the benefits offered by the paternalistic socialist state such as 
guaranteed employment and subsidised provisions came at too high a price. In the words of 
Mart Laar1, “the overall goal was to return Estonia to Europe” echoing the symbolic significance 
of ‘Europe’ as a concept synonymous with not just the end of the communist era but also the 
concept of civil society. Looking to Europe as the beacon of civil society is not uncommon across 
the CEE (Verdery, 2006). To Estonians ‘returning to Europe’ means the end of alien domination 
and the opportunity to build a sovereign and prosperous nation.  
 
The ultraliberal nature of Estonian economic policies was underlined by the country’s EU 
accession when international organisations, such as the World Bank and the EU, advised 
Estonia to ‘de-liberalise’ them. Estonia’s adjustment to the EU acquis communitaire meant the 
de-liberalisation of its economy through the adoption of regulatory measures (Adam, et al. 
                                                          
1
 Prime Minister of Estonia 1992 - 1994 and 1999 - 2002 
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2009), such as introduction of trade barriers and labour market regulations. Urmas Varblane2 
explained the process of de-neoliberalisation: 
“…when we started to negotiate joining EU suddenly we discovered that when 
we join EU, we should implement tariffs… Estonia is a unique country in the 
world. Joining the EU does not mean the growth of liberalisation of trade but 
the growth of protectionism against third countries.” 
 
In the next sections I analyse the Estonian imaginary, which was a determining factor in policy 
formulators’ choice of neoliberal policies in their quest to maintain political and economic 
sovereignty and promote economic growth.   
 
The Estonian self-image  
In the words of Pickel (2003: 122), “(e)conomic nationalism is not so much about the economy 
as it is about the nation – the economic dimensions of specific nationalisms make sense only in 
the context of a particular national discourse…” In order to understand economic nationalism in 
Estonia, an examination of the Estonian context is essential. Estonia’s transition was driven by 
people under constraints of path-dependence and dynamic political, economic and social 
conditions.  
 
National identity has a clear influence over economic policies in post-socialist transition 
(Eichler, 2005). In the words of the leading Estonian sociologist, Taagepera (1993: 6), national 
culture is a “murky field of inquiry that has no easy answers, but some quality in Estonians has 
                                                          
2
 Member of the Supervisory Board of the Bank of Estonia 
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enabled them to survive and develop with an extremely small population…” Estonians self-
categorise themselves as an individualistic and self-reliant nation, which they use as 
justification for the ultra-liberal model that they have chosen. Estonia’s policy choices were 
more than a mere economic dilemma. The lenses through which policy makers viewed their 
options were shaped and chiselled by history and more specifically by their national struggle for 
survival.  
 
Estonians perceive themselves as Nordic of Finno-Ugric origins with close historical, cultural 
and economic links with Scandinavia reflecting European values of ‘civil society’ and a free-
market economic orientation, which has been reconstituted following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union (Lieven, 1993; Piirimäe, 1997; Smith, 2001). Estonia’s self-image is firmly 
rooted in its millennia-long relations with the Nordic countries, which left its imprint on 
architecture, culture and mentality (Piiramäe, 1997). As Estonian Prime Minister Taavi 
Rõivas stated in March 2015 “We are a Nordic country in terms of culture, in terms of 
mentality” (Financial Times, 2015). 
 
Geography played a significant role in the formation of the Estonian self-image. Estonia is 
very scarcely populated; it is the second most sparsely populated country in Europe with an 
area of Denmark but only one-fifth of its population (Statistical Office of Estonia) leaving 
limited opportunities for socialisation. Their resilient and hard-working nature is coupled 
with egoism and a large doze of individualism (Lieven, 1993) manifesting itself in their 
preference of technology over human contact. As Taagepera (2002: 254) puts it, “hope for 
technological-scientific solutions rather than cooperation with fellow humans naturally ties 
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to the belief in hard but individual work”. Estonians admit that they are a “relatively 
individualistic nation”. According to an Estonian adage “if I can see the smoke from my 
neighbour’s chimney, then he lives too close” (interviews). Their ‘radical individualism’ is 
illustrated in post-socialist Estonia in low levels of trade union membership. Despite the 
harsh social impact of liberal economic restructuring, Estonian trade unions have been very 
quiet, according to interviewees, contradicting the “simplistic” assumption that “the role 
played by the unions will mirror that of their western counterparts” (Herod, 1998: 204). Egle 
Käärats3 underlined the individualistic nature of Estonians that manifests itself in employer-
employee relations.  
“They are trying to negotiate with their employer their terms and contracts 
individually and handle their problems on their own... Estonians rely on 
individual negotiation and individual dispute resolution rather than collective 
actions.” 
 
Norkus (2007) points to the Pietist cultural legacy as an important determinant of Estonian 
policies of the late 1980s and 1990s. The Pietist ‘Herrnhuter’ or Moravian Brethren 
movement - with their firm belief in piousness, values of temperance, personal hygiene, 
choral singing, self-education and hard work - spread its missions to Estland and Livonia in 
the 18th century. Although all three Baltic Republics experienced ‘only’ five decades of 
Soviet rule, as opposed to seventy years in other parts of the USSR, Estonia’s economic 
performance surpassed those of Latvia and Lithuania. He goes as far as labelling Estonians 
‘Baltic Lombardians’ to signify their industrious nature. Miljan (1989) points to the work 
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 Deputy Secretary General on Labour Policy, Ministry of Social Affairs. 
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ethic of Lutheran Estonians as a cause of the relative affluence of the Estonian Soviet 
Socialist Republic (ESSR) in the Soviet Union and contrasts it with the ‘anti-Protestant work 
ethic in Russia’, as the main obstacle to attempts championed by Mikhail Gorbachev, 
General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to reform the Soviet 
economy in the late 1980s. The Economist (2012) praised Estonia’s entrepreneurial record 
as the “best in the industrialised world”. Margus Laidre4 discussed the value system of 
Estonians:   
“…Estonians throughout the history have been quite down to earth, quite 
realistic, stubborn, and even, which I don’t regard as a compliment necessarily, 
materialistic. Therefore, as it has always been, very important to Estonians to 
have safe, good home, why not a house, to have a car, etc. materialistic 
belongings, a good life.” 
 
The memory of historical suffering  
The representation of one’s own nation victimised by other nations, which is a common theme 
across CEE (Verdery: 1996), occupies a central place in the Estonian imaginary. Their ‘memory 
of historical suffering’ is rooted in their nation’s and culture’s survival despite foreign 
domination for over seven hundred years, most of which were spent in serfdom (Feldman, 
2000). The survival of the small Estonian nation, its culture and language in spite of centuries of 
foreign rule has instilled a strong sense of national identity, as illustrated by an interviewee: “To 
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 Represented the Republic of Estonia as Ambassador to Sweden, Germany, the UK, and Finland, Senior 
Advisor, Office of the President of the Republic of Estonia 
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be an Estonian is not just to belong to a certain nationality, it is a profession!” Lieven (1993: 18) 
cites Enn Soosaar, writer and political analyst to sum up the Estonian self-image:  
”For centuries, Balts have had only two choices: to survive as nations or to 
merge into larger nations. You could say that we decided, subconsciously but 
collectively, to survive. So for us, nationalism is a mode of existence… To 
survive, you must be nationalist.” 
   
The argument that nation is not synonymous with country or state (Pickel, 2005) is true in 
the case of Estonia, as present day Estonia had not taken its current shape until the early 
20th century either as a unified nation or a single territorial administrative unit. Despite their 
long presence in Estonia’s present territory, Estonia has been a ‘self-aware nation’ less than 
a hundred years. The country took its current territorial shape in February 1917 when the 
provisional government of Russia unified Estland and Northern Livonia into a single 
administrative unit in response to Estonian demands for increased autonomy. With the 
approval of the Estonian representative assembly, the Maapäev, the National Salvation 
Committee proclaimed independence on February 24, 1918, whereby Estonia became an 
independent self-aware sovereign state. Up to 1918 there had never been an Estonian state; 
their national awareness was embodied in their constant struggle to nurture and foster the 
Estonian culture (Lieven, 1993; Smith, 2001). 
 
 The prosperous years of the First Estonian Republic proved the nation’s ability to function 
as a modern European state, which had an instrumental role during the Soviet era in 
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preserving Estonian culture (Lieven, 1993; Taagepera, 1993). The nation had an open 
economy with extensive investment and trade links with the West. Its speedy development 
was aided by foreign capital, mainly from the country’s largest trading partners, Britain and 
Germany. Economic development was fast; the country’s population enjoyed a relatively 
high level of well-being. By the end of the 1930s, Estonia had a well-developed 
infrastructure and a skilled industrial labour force with average earnings near Western 
European levels (Kahk and Tarvel, 1997). Despite the authoritarian rule of the late 1930s, 
the First Republic is remembered as an era of political sovereignty and economic prosperity 
(Lieven, 1993). It has enormous economic, political and social significance in Estonian 
consciousness, memories of which were kept alive in families throughout the Soviet era 
(Lauristin, 1997). The strong desire to ‘catch up with the West’ among Estonians in the post-
socialist era was significantly enhanced by the experience of the First Republic in the 
interwar era when life expectancy in Estonia was higher than in Finland (Vihalemm, 1997).  
 
The First Republic came to a sudden end when Soviet troops invaded in 1940. The independent 
Estonian Republic lost its sovereign statehood and became an integral part of the Soviet Union 
(Lieven, 1993, Smith, 2001). During the Soviet era standards of living in Estonia were much 
below those of Western Europe. The Estonian population did not benefit from their higher than 
Soviet average productivity rates and efficient agricultural production because the central 
authorities were constantly increasing the export quotas, which Estonian producers had no 
choice but to fulfil. In essence, Estonian farmers were feeding other Soviet republics (Miljan, 
1989). To sum up the damage done to the ESSR’s economy and the population’s standards of 
living, “the income and consumption level of the Estonian population had dropped to the level 
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of the year 1920; the living standards hardly ever reached the level of the late 1930s” (Kutsar 
and Trumm, 1993, p. 130). If Estonia had been able to develop in a manner similar to Finland, 
its per capita output could have been four or five times its level at the turn of the 21st century 
(Klesment, 2009) of €4,500 (Statistical Office of Estonia). The state of the Estonian economy in 
the early 1990s was dramatic; as interviewees recalled, “we saw how poor we are”, “we didn’t 
have anything”.  
 
Hale (2008: 2) frames ethnicity as a “powerful determinant of the strategies that people use to 
pursue the things that motivate them”, in order to maximise their “life chances" (p. 62). He lists 
materialism, security, power, self-esteem and status as motives in ethnic group behaviour. He 
argues that the desire for national independence is strongly associated with long-run economic 
expectations. Indeed, as Ardo Hansson5 recalls, the overriding objective of Estonian policy 
makers was “to increase living standards… I think a lot of it was just breaking from East to 
West… and moving towards Europe…”  
 
Khazanov (1995) points to the skewed Soviet economic development dominated by the Russian 
core as a major cause of economic nationalism in the former Soviet Union. Indeed, Soviet 
domination had a long-lasting adverse impact on its economy, polity, society and above all its 
national consciousness. Vihalemm (1997) argues that historically Estonia was able to survive 
and develop under foreign rule throughout the centuries until Soviet annexation because there 
was no mass immigration to Estonia from its occupiers. Soviet occupation changed that. 
Whereas on the eve of World War II 92 percent of the country’s population were ethnic 
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 Advisor to the Estonian government 1991 - 1997 
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Estonian, it decreased to 74.6 percent by 1959 and 61 percent by 1988 (Khazanov, 1995: 7). 
Taagepera (1993) argues that Russification of Estonia was close to the point of irreversibility. 
This view was echoed by an interviewee: “There are so few of us, we sometimes think that we 
are like the Mohicans!”  
 
Lenin regarded nationalism as a “by-product of capitalism that would become irrelevant as 
socialism developed” (Hale, 2008: 96). The Party Programme of 1961 referred to the 
peoples of the Soviet Union as ‘united into one family’ (Shaw, 1995). Khruschev spoke of a 
merger between the various peoples of the USSR ultimately leading to the emergence of 
homo sovieticus, the new Soviet citizen (Smith, 2001). Soviet policy towards nationalities 
was the eradication of nationalistic and ethnic differences and create a ‘new transcendent 
Soviet identity’, which Shaw (1995) describes as ‘federal colonialism’ and Smith (2001) labels 
‘ethno-territorial federalism’. The federal republics of the USSR enjoyed cultural autonomy, 
which meant the ability to use their vernacular languages in administration, education, and 
culture (Shaw, 1995; Smith, 2001), and certain autonomy in hiring preferences leading to 
prevalence of minority nationalities at republic level. However, power remained with the 
central authority of Moscow and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which was 
reflected in the popular slogan ‘nationalist in form, socialist in content’ (Khazanov, 1995). 
The cultural and social policy of the USSR was aimed at the assimilation of nationalities, 
Balts included, by shifting their national identification to Soviet. Russians were the dominant 
nationality in the USSR; they were the most populous ethnic group and occupied the most 
important economic and political posts (Beissinger, 2002; Hale, 2008). Russian language was 
promoted heavily squeezing out Estonian in public life and in the media. History was being 
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rewritten to underline Estonia’s ‘close link’ with Russia (Shaw, 1995; Smith, 2001). The 
objective of Soviet nationality policy was the “social, cultural, and linguistic unification of all 
nationalities in the USSR on the basis of Russian or, more accurately, Soviet-Russian 
culture”. The line in a once-popular Soviet song “(m)y address is not a house or a street, my 
address is the whole Soviet Union” sums up this policy (Khazanov, 1995: 12 and 88).  
 
“If a state loses sovereignty, it has not survived as a state; if a society loses its identity, it has 
not survived as itself” (Wæver, 1995: 405). The relocation of ethnic Russians served not only 
the purpose of meeting the demands of industrialisation for labour but also facilitated the 
assimilation of the peoples of the Soviet Union and the creation of a ‘Soviet urban 
proletariat’. The Soviet authorities distrusted non-Russian nationalities and regarded 
Russians as the pioneers of socialism (Mettam and Williams, 2001). The majority of the 
Soviet leadership were Russians, who encouraged the migration of Russians to non-Russian 
areas in order to “create or increase loyal and reliable groups of the population in these 
areas” (Khazanov, 1995: 6). The Estonian nation had to deal with the full impact of Soviet 
occupation, which was more than just the loss of political and economic independence. The 
loss of the country’s indigenous population followed by the repatriation of large numbers of 
workers from other parts of the USSR permanently altered Estonia’s ethnic scene (Kukk, 
1993). The onslaught of Soviet ideology and culture threatened the very survival of Estonian 
national identity. In Taagepera’s (1993: 68) view, the Soviet annexation of Estonia was 
nothing short of Estonia’s colonisation, an “unmitigated disaster”. Soviet economic policy 
was viewed by non-Russians as serving Russian needs at the expense of non-Russian 
populations (Khazanov, 1995).  
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Fifty years of collectivist and paternalistic Soviet rule is construed as domination by an alien 
culture over a country of ‘European values’ (Kalmus and Vihalemm, 2006). Estonia’s 
declaration of independence on 20 August, 1991, is not regarded as the birth of the Third 
Republic – the second one being the ESSR - or the Second (independent) Republic but 
signifies the end to Soviet power in Estonia and the restoration of the Estonian Republic 
along the ‘principle of legal continuity’. In effect, it is a restitution of the First Republic 
(Lieven, 1993). Holding Independence Day celebrations on February 24, the anniversary of 
the birth of sovereign Estonia in 1918, instead of August 20, which marked the declaration 
of independence from the USSR in 1991, underlines the continuity of the Estonian state and 
its strong links with the First Republic.  
 
Freedom is a central theme of Estonia’s transition, as attested by many respondents.  
“The first goal was to become free and independent and the second very 
important issue was to live in a free country and free society.”   
Under communism Estonians had neither economic nor political sovereignty (Lieven, 1993; 
Taagepera, 1993; Smith, 2001). A respondent explains: 
“This idea of personal freedom and freedom for the nation, these were the 
most important things. Now when we take this idea of freedom, I guess in 
many cases for many people it was just carried over to economic freedom.” 
These narratives echo Polanyi’s (1944) description of a liberal economy as a utopian vision and 
Friedman’s (1962: 20) argument that “communism would destroy all of our freedoms”. They 
are reminders of Friedman’s (1962: 8) analysis of economic and political freedoms: 
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“Economic arrangements play a dual role in the promotion of a free society. On 
the one hand, freedom in economic arrangements is a component of freedom 
broadly understood, so economic freedom is an end in itself. In the second 
place, economic freedom is also an indispensable means towards the 
achievement of political freedom.” 
Enn Listra6 labelled the Soviet system as “feudal”, upon the collapse of which “people felt total 
freedom. You can see it even now in our society. Total freedom means that my freedom is not 
restricted by your freedom”. Soviet domination strengthened their desire of establishing a free-
market economy based on the unrestricted ‘total freedom’ of the individual placing neoliberal 
theory in a favourable light. According to interviewees, the paradigm to “take care of yourself… 
went to the extreme” and “at this time it was very popular to be very right wing”. The neoliberal 
paradigm held immense appeal to Estonian policy makers, as expressed by this interview 
excerpt below:  
“There is also, some kind of a background feeling in Estonia that if I am going 
to be a protectionist, then I make myself as some outstanding fool. The main 
line is liberal and now behave like that and I am not like some Frenchman who 
is fighting for government and statehood.” 
Jaak Leimann7 explained the rationale behind their pursuit of neoliberal policies: 
“Friedman and such kind of freedom was very popular here. It is 
understandable because we had so regulated system for a long time, so 
regulated from Moscow. So we decided to go from this ‘very regulated’ to 
                                                          
6 Member of the Supervisory Board of the Bank of Estonia 
7
 Minister of Finance 1991-1992, 1996-1999 
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‘minimum regulated’… It was easier to chop this other world. Even such kind of 
half-regulated was, for us, too regulated.” 
To Estonains the neoliberal trajectory is a form of ethnic policy that reduces the geopolitical 
and economic uncertainties surrounding their nation and maximises the chances of their 
nation’s prosperity. Neoliberal theory regards the “political ideals of individual liberty and 
freedom as sacrosanct” (Harvey, 2007: 24). The term ‘total freedom’ was brought up 
repeatedly by interviewees. Estonia’s ‘return to Europe’ progressed through ultra-liberal 
policies, which were unparalleled among the transition countries, as clearly stated by Mart 
Laar: 
“Usually, the IMF or World Bank seem very radical on reforms. Not for us. For 
us they were always too mild.”  
 
‘Window of opportunity’ 
Estonia became an independent nation by exploiting the favourable geopolitical situation 
created by nationalist movements in other parts of the USSR and the coup in August 1991, 
which hastened the disintegration of the Soviet Union (Taagepera, 1993). The failed coup 
attempt followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union created a unique window of opportunity, 
which Estonians exploited finding themselves in charge of their nation again after half a century 
of Soviet occupation. Estonia declared its independence on August 20, 1991. 
 
Russia was among the first to recognise Estonia’s breakaway from the Soviet Union (Lieven, 
1993). Russia’s push for a break from the Soviet Union was crucial as Boris Yeltsin, who had 
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been a member of the nomenklatura since 1968 and became President of the Russian Soviet 
Federative Socialist Republic in June 1991, did not oppose Baltic separatism (Trapans, 1994) and 
was a “consistent proponent of a voluntary state” (Beissinger, 2002). The Russian Supreme 
Soviet opposed armed intervention in the Baltic States. In January 1991, Yeltsin travelled to the 
Baltic States during the military intervention in Lithuania and publicly appealed to Russian 
soldiers not to become “pawns in the hands of dark reactionary forces” (Lieven, 1993: 305), 
which helped Estonia avoid armed confrontation (Raun, 2001). Defying popular Russian opinion 
he signed statements of mutual recognition with the Baltic States and condemned the use of 
military force in the Baltic States (Taagepera, 1993).  
 
Whereas uncertainty is a “feature of all post-communist transformations” (Orenstein, 2001: 
134), in Estonia it was significantly aggravated by the presence of Russian troops on Estonian 
soil until 1994 and the unpredictability of Russia’s policies. As in 1918, through a combination of 
favourable external situation and local agency, Estonia became a sovereign state (Raun, 1991; 
Lieven, 1993). Jaak Jõerüüt8  explained: 
“We are lucky that they left in 1994. But for those 3 years it was very difficult… 
Nobody knew how much Moscow has changed. There was a window of 
opportunity… I remember very well that feeling. For a very long time you just 
don’t know what situation comes and then one nice August day the window 
opens. You had to act immediately.” 
                                                          
8 Member of the Supreme Council of the ESSR, Minister of Defence 2004-2005 
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This ‘window of opportunity’ is what many refer to as the long-awaited chance to “run away 
from the colossus of the Soviet Union as quickly as possible” (interview). To all interviewees 
regaining independence took place within a unique ‘window of opportunity’, which they believe 
has been shut since. They all agree that had Estonia not regained independence when it did, it 
would be impossible today. Grachev’s (2008: 231) assessment of the political climate in Russia 
echoes these narratives: “many observers have represented the current uncertain trend as 
‘back to the USSR’”. 
 
Although Russia was quick in its recognition of Baltic independence (Lieven, 1993), Russian 
foreign policy quickly hardened, reminding some of a Russian version of the Monroe Doctrine. 
The protection of the rights of Russians living in the former Soviet Union outside Russia became 
a popular tool in the hands of Russian politicians to build political capital (Khazanov, 1995). The 
relative success of the extreme right in Russia’s parliamentary elections in December 1993 
further exacerbated an already sensitive situation, in which Russian politicians, including 
Defence Minister Pavel Grachev, linked the issue of troop withdrawals to the condition of 
Russians living in Estonia (Raun, 1994). In 1994, Russian foreign minister Andrey Kozyrev stated 
that “the countries of the CIS and the Baltics – this is a region where the vital interests of Russia 
are concentrated… We should not withdraw from those regions which have been the sphere of 
Russia’s interest for centuries” (Khazanov, 1995: 87). In spring 2005, Russian President Vladimir 
Putin, whom the Financial Times (22.09.2014) labels the “most dangerous nationalist in 
Europe” called the collapse of the Soviet Union the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 
20th century” in his state of the nation speech. He described it as a "real drama" which left 
millions of Russians outside the Russian Federation (BBC News). Recent foreign policy debates 
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in Russia on how to re-establish Russian influence in the former Soviet states (Judah, 2014) 
provide further proof for Estonians that regaining independence took place in a ‘window of 
opportunity’.   
 
Woo-Cumings (2005) brings up security concerns, the threat of extinction to a nation, as 
powerful contributors to nationalist economic policies in the East-Asian context. Historical 
precedents and current political events have significantly amplified Estonian security concerns. 
Numerous interviewees highlight the manipulation of ethnic Russians by the Kremlin further 
enhancing Estonians’ sense of insecurity, which was aggravated by the ‘War of Monuments’ 
during 2004-2007 that peaked in the April 2007 riots following the relocation of the Bronze 
Soldier from Tallinn city centre to a cemetery. The subsequent cyber-attacks on Estonian 
government websites and the blockade of the Estonian embassy in Moscow (Smith, 2008) 
where demonstrators waved placards with the slogan “Wanted the ambaSSador of eSStonia” 
(Judah, 2014: 110) further intensified Estonian anxiety. According to a survey carried out by 
Levada Centre, a Moscow-based non-governmental research organisation, Russians regarded 
Estonia as the country ‘most unfriendly and hostile to Russia’ in 2007. In the second half of 
2014, Estonia still ranked among the top 5 countries on the same list. Russia’s annexation of the 
Crimea in 2014 significantly aggravated Estonian security concerns (Eesti Päevaleht, 2014). In 
September 2014, Estonia’s Defence Minister questioned the credibility of Russia’s will to find a 
political solution to its conflict with Ukraine and called on EU and American leaders to increase 
the presence of NATO forces in Eastern Europe (Estonian Ministry of Defence).  
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Estonia’s post-socialist economic policies underline Tsygankov’s (2005) findings that a strong 
sense of national identity may increase support for liberal policies. In Estonia it served as a 
strategy to move away from the Russian sphere. One interviewee perceived the Soviet era 
as a “huge distortion”. The will of “no way to return to the Soviet Union” and to “get as fast 
and as far away as possible” led to a situation where “everybody wanted liberal policies” 
(interviews). Another respondent ironically summarised an apparently common Estonian 
perception of relations with Russia: “The relations with Russia cannot be improved unless we 
rejoin mother Russia.” Such sentiments add more pressure to the country’s post-socialist 
efforts to distance themselves from the Soviet past and Russia by joining international 
organisations, particularly the EU and NATO, and greatly contribute to their speedy 
implementation of reforms in order to quickly reorient the country’s economy from east to 
west. As Mart Laar explained, “we were enormously hurried”. 
 
It is not a coincidence that independent Estonia pursued the policy of ‘bandwagoning’, 
which Lamoreaux and Galbreath (2008) call the joining of a small country with a strong 
nation or alliance in order to protect its sovereignty. Integration with the European Union 
served their economic and security interests. Fifty years of Soviet domination, which ended 
the country’s brief independence, made Estonians very sensitive to Russian policies. 
Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians alike consider Russia a very real threat to their 
sovereignty (Lamoreaux and Galbreath, 2008) greatly enhancing their sense of insecurity. 
Similar to other countries in CEE, EU accession has economic as well as political and national 
security significance.  
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Western attitudes to Estonian independence 
Estonia’s aspirations to sovereignty over their own affairs have withstood the indifference, 
and on occasions outright hostility, of the major geopolitical powers. For over seven 
hundred years they found their own destiny shaped by external forces, gradually forming a 
sense of abandonment and self-reliance. History has instilled a need to ‘go it alone’ in 
Estonians strengthening their resolve and awareness of abandonment and self-dependency. 
They learned to become self-reliant reflecting the neoliberal emphasis on the responsible 
individual. Estonian single-mindedness and suspiciousness were aggravated by the 
ambivalent attitude of the western powers regarding Estonia’s status as an independent 
nation three times in one century in 1918, 1940 and 1991 (Trapans, 1994). On all these 
occasions the major geopolitical powers ignored the will of the Estonian people (Piiramäe, 
1997).  
 
Although the Allied powers after World War I were in favour of self-determination, they 
were reluctant to recognise the independence of the Baltic states as they perceived the 
matter to be part of Russia‘s internal affairs. They only recognised Estonian and Latvian 
independence in 1921 (MacMillan, 2001). Estonia found its interests overshadowed by the 
West’s ‘Russia first’ policy in 1940 when Soviet invasion led to the incorporation of the Baltic 
States, including Estonia, into the USSR ending its sovereignty. Although “three member 
states of the League of Nations suddenly vanished from political existence and came under 
foreign occupation” (Lange, 1994: 233), western concerns to maintain the anti-Nazi alliance 
with the Soviet Union during World War II and to preserve the status quo during the Cold 
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War precluded any active support for the Baltic States, including Estonia (Lieven, 1993; 
Piiramäe, 1997; Smith, 2001). 
 
Their sense of abandonment and of being let down by the international community has fed 
their sense of the need to ‘go it alone’, a feeling that was to be resurrected again in the late 
1980s when Western leaders‘ main concern was to support Gorbachev. Estonian officials 
came to the realisation that the Western powers viewed Baltic aspirations for sovereignty as 
jeopardising Gorbachev’s reforms (Raun, 1991; Lange, 1994, Grachev, 2008). As Beissinger 
(2002: 444)  argues, “until fall 1991, when the disintegration of the Soviet state became a 
fiat accompli, Western leaders did everything in their power to keep the USSR from falling 
apart“. As late as summer 1991, George Bush Sr. in his “chicken Kiev“ speech (p. 444) 
advised that “freedom is not the same as independence” (Khazanov, 1995: 43). The cool 
western reaction to the Baltic independence movements was echoed by Tiit Vähi9: “Frankly 
speaking, not everybody in ’89 until ’91 supported our independence. Sometimes they were 
not looking at us very friendly.”  
  
Estonian politicians consider Western reaction to the riots in Tallinn and the subsequent cyber-
attacks on Estonian government websites in 2007 as lukewarm. A senior diplomat commented:   
“The events in April (2007)...  showed clearly that we don’t necessarily have the 
international support and understanding to the level we might expect... we 
were left out in the cold.” 
                                                          
9
 Prime Minister of Estonia 1990-1992 and 1995-1997 
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The goal: political, economic and cultural sovereignty – the mechanism: neoliberal policy  
Post-socialist transformation took place in a neoliberal world. Neoliberalism, in some 
countries labelled ‘shock therapy’, was the dominant strategy in the political and economic 
transformation of CEE (Orenstein, 2001). The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the 
centrally planned economic system, along with the unsuccessful import-substitution 
strategies of many developing countries and the relative success of the US economy in the 
1990s, have significantly strengthened the hegemony of neoliberal ideas (Kelsey, 1995; Frye, 
2010). The failure of the centrally planned economies and the end of the socialist era in CEE 
have been interpreted by many as the victory of the self-healing free-market economy, 
proof of the malfunctioning of government intervention in the market (Peet, 2007) that 
“encouraged acceptance of unrestricted markets as the solution to the economic ills of 
modern society” (Gilpin, 2001: 8). 
 
“National sentiment became a form of anticommunism” (Verdery, 1996: 82) and 
“anticommunism has an affinity for liberal reform” (Frye, 2010: 50). Estonia’s post-socialist 
policy choices were mediated by path dependence, their views of Estonian history and culture, 
by memories of pre-war independence, and by experiences of the Soviet period. Furthermore, 
neoliberal ideology’s call for an active society along with its rejection of dependence on a 
paternalistic state has played a progressive role in motivating people to proactively improve 
their own fate. These policies were instrumental in Estonia’s national drive to transform its 
centrally planned economy to a market economy and to reduce Russia’s political and economic 
influence in the country by reorienting its economy from East to West.  
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History and the country’s ambivalent geopolitical situation instilled a collective memory of 
injustice in Estonians leading to a self-image of individualism and self-reliance. Half a century of 
Soviet totalitarian domination left them with strong anti-statist attitudes resenting dependence 
on a ‘nanny state’. Estonians proactively discarded the legacy of central planning in favour of a 
free market economy emphasising values compatible with neoliberal theory, such as individual 
initiative, self-reliance, accountability, and a minimalistic state. 
 
Unlike in Poland, where the neoliberal “big bang” reform (Sachs, 1993: 48) lasted about one 
and a half years due to popular opposition caused by a sharp decline in the living standards 
of the majority of the population (Orenstein, 2001), in Estonia the radical reforms of the 
successive administrations “enjoyed broad national consent” (Lauristin and Vihalemm, 
2009: 9). Estonia’s population was willing to make serious sacrifices and waited patiently for 
the fruits of shock therapy to materialise providing the new administration with plenty of 
room to manoeuvre. The experiences of the Soviet era fuelled Estonians’ desire for 
freedom. They wanted to move quickly from the Soviet Union to the western world, despite 
the benefits offered by the paternalistic socialist state, as lack of sovereignty was too high a 
price. Indeed, the   
“…political ideals of individual liberty and freedom… are indeed compelling and 
greatly appealing concepts. Such ideals empowered the dissident movements 
in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union before the end of the cold war…” 
(Harvey, 2007: 24).  
Notwithstanding Estonia’s Scandinavian ties and self-perceived Nordic identity, Estonian 
leaders did not emulate their economic policies. Andres Tarand offered an explanation as to 
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why the Scandinavian social-democratic system with its strong welfare state was not 
followed: “with Friedman as an apostle it became a bit ridiculous comparing ourselves with 
the Nordic countries and others”. Estonian policy makers emphasised the need for 
“minimum government regulation and control of business activity by the state”. As echoed 
by many interviewees, Scandinavia seemed “too socialist” with “awful” tax regimes, an 
“unaffordable” welfare system and “over-unionised” industries. Such narratives support 
Orenstein’s (2001) argument that potentially good policy alternatives were ignored in the 
transition of the CEE, as they lied outside the ideological range of policy makers.  
 
Conclusion 
In this article I used Estonia’s post-socialist economic policies as evidence to argue that 
there is no incongruence between economic nationalism and neoliberalism. Economic 
nationalism needs to be examined in view of the self-image of the nation and the objectives 
of policy makers. The national imaginary and self-image are crucial determinants of political 
and economic decisions. Estonia’s post-socialist transformation has been a sum of historical, 
social and cultural factors affected by the common experience of successful as well as 
unsuccessful efforts of gaining and preserving statehood. Their collective memory of 
historical injustice has created a sense of abandonment and a ‘go-it alone’ stance that are 
compatible with the neoliberal values of individualism, personal responsibility and 
dependence on oneself. Neoliberal theory with its emphasis on individual liberty has been 
an attractive proposition to populations living under totalitarian rule, such as the post-
socialist states of Central and Eastern Europe. In post-socialist Estonia neoliberal policies 
form an integral part of economic nationalism.  
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